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PROPERTY
DAWD H. MEANS*
Adverse Possession of Timber Land
One of the most interesting cases decided during the survey
period is Mullis v. Winchester,1 in which the question pre-
sented was what acts are sufficient to constitute an adverse
possession of timber land.
The facts were that in 1943 plaintiff purchased a tract
of 310 acres for a consideration of $8,500. Plaintiff's ven-
dor had purchased the tract at a void tax sale, and concededly
plaintiff acquired no title by the conveyance to him. In 1957
plaintiff instituted this action against the heirs of the former
owner pursuant to §§ 65-3301-65-3306,2 to remove a cloud
on and quiet title to the tract, plaintiff alleging that he had
acquired title thereto by adverse possession under color of
title. The answer of the defendant heirs denied the allega-
tion of adverse possession.
The case was tried before a jury, and defendants presented
no testimony. The testimony for plaintiff was as follows.
Plaintiff was the owner of a lumber company, and had pur-
chased the tract for the cutting and growing of timber thereon.
Shortly after his purchase in 1943, plaintiff's representative
contacted one of the defendant heirs and advised her that
plaintiff had purchased the land and desired to obtain from
her the plat thereof, which was in her possession. This plat
the defendant heir delivered to plaintiff's representative
for ten dollars, without at that time asserting any claim of
ownership of the land by herself and the other heirs. Plain-
tiff then, with the help of adjoining landowners, had the tract
surveyed. Thereafter, at a time the Court found "not de-
finitely fixed in the testimony,"3 plaintiff cut the mer-
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 237 S. C. 487, 118 S. E. 2d 61 (1961).
2. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 65-3301 - 65-3306 (1952)
which pertain to suits to clear tax titles.
1 3. On cross examination the testimony of plaintiff's timber buyer
relative to the time of cutting was as follows: "About three years after
we bought the timber." (R. 22). "I imagine it was about '46 .... Maybe
not quite that long . . . . I don't know exactly when the place was
cut." (R. 26) The witness admitted that although there were records
in the office, he had not brought them, (R. 22) nor had he looked at
them. (R. 26) The testimony of a neighboring landowner was equally
vague and indefinite.
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chantable timber (trees with a diameter greater than ten to
twelve inches). The cutting was done by a crew of eight to
ten men, and the timber cut was hauled away by three trucks
which used woods roads upon the land; the cutting was
accomplished in "more than one day and less than three
months." 4 Plaintiff followed the same cutting practice on
this tract as he did on other lands he owned; he cut in-
frequently because he considered it good forestry practice to
cut only the larger trees. There was a second cutting of tim-
ber on the tract, but such took place after institution of
plaintiff's suit in 1957. After his purchase plaintiff paid the
taes thereafter accruing, which were assessed in his name.
The people in the community considered the land as belong-
ing to plaintiff. The land was.hilly, and timber growing
was the best use to which it could be put.
The jury returned a verdict for defendants, but the trial
judge set it aside and granted judgment for plaintiff non
obsta.nte veredicto. On appeal; affirmect, the Supreme Court
agreed with the -trial.judge that the only inference to be
drawn from the evidence was that plaintiff had acquired
title by adverse possession. The Court said:
Acts of adverse possession, or acts of ownership, with
regard to open,, wild, unfenced lands, lands not capable
of cultivation, are only required to be exercised in such
way and in such manner as is consistent with the use to
which the lands may be put and the situation of the prop-
erty admits of without actual residence or occupancy.
We think the trial judge was correct in concluding that
the acts of adverse possession by [plaintiff] .were suffi-
-cient to establish requisite continuity of possession for
the statutory period of ten years, particularly in view of
the use to which this tract of land could be put and the
situation of the property.. The [plaintiff] entered upon
this land under color of title and possessed and ocupied
same for his ordinary ise .in obtaining timber therefrom
and growing timber thereon. Section 10-2423 (3), .1952
Code of Laws of South Carolina.5
4. REcoRD, p. 23.
5. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-2423 (1952) provides:
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any per-
son claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judg-
ment or decree, land shall be deemed to have been possessed and oc-
cupied in the following cases:
[Vol. 14
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Analyzing the evidence, it is difficult to regard any single
item as conclusive on the issue of possession. Ordinarily the
taking and recording of a void deed does not of itself place
the grantee in adverse possession of the land purportedly
conveyed, though it seems that in at least one jurisdiction the
rule is otherwise if such grantee is claiming wild and un-
occupied land under a recorded tax deed which, though void,
is valid on its face.0 Nor (anent the purchase of the plat
from one of the heirs) does notice to the owner of land of
a purported claim thereto alone start the running of the
statute in favor of the claimant.
The isolated act of making a survey of land would seem a
mere trespass rather than a continuing possession of the tract
surveyed. 7 As a general rule, the cutting of timber as a
single transaction on land is not regarded as the establish-
ment of a continuing adverse possession.8 Furthermore, in
the-instant case the Court was careful to note that the time
of the cutting "is not definitely fixed in the testimony,"9 so
(1) When it has been usually cultivated or improved;
(2) When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure;
(3) When, although not enclosed, it has been used for the supply
of fuel or of fencing timber, for the purposes of husbandry or for
the ordinary use' of the occupant; and
(4) When a known farm or a single lot has been partly im-
proved the portion of such farm or lot that may have been left
not cleared or not enclosed, according to the usual course and
custom of the adjoining country, shall be deemed to have been
occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and
cultivated.
In several states it has been held that such a statute is in appli-
cable unless the claimant is otherwise in. actual possession of a part
of the land. Note, Cutting of Timber as Adverse Possession, 170
A. L. R. 887, 923 (1947). In the instant case. plaintiff had no such
actual possession. While Bardin v. Commercial Insurance & Trust Co.,
82 S. C. 358, 64 S. E. 165 (1909), would seem to impose no such require-
ment (the facts as well as the exact. thrust on appeal are not clear),
there the claimant apparently had made repeated cuttings. Moreover, in
the instant case there was uncertainty as to the time of the single cutting.
Supra, note 3.
6. See the Wisconsin -cases cited. in 22 A. L. R. 550, 553 (1923).
7. Alston v. McDowall, 1 McMul. 444 (1840); Slice v. Derrick, 2
Rich. 627 (1846).,
8. To the effect that occasional entries to cut timber do not constitute
a continuing actual possession, see Bailey v. Irby, 2 N. & McC. 343
(1820); White ads. Reid, 2 N. McC. "534 (1820),; McBeth v. Donnelly,
Dudley 177 (1838); Mullins Lumber Co. v. Williamson & Brown Land
& Lumber Co., 255 F. 645 (4th Cir. 1918). In 170 A. L. R. 887, 896
(1947) it is said, "The better rule is that one has actual possession of
land during the time he actually conducts timbering operations on it."
In the instant case, however, while the cutting was extensive, the actual
occupancy during such cutting continued only "more than one day and less
than three months."
9. Supra, note 3.
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it cannot be inferred that more than ten years"o thereafter
had elapsed before action commenced.
It seems clear that payment of taxes alone is insufficient
to give possession of land to the taxpayer,1' nor does commun-
ity repute as to the ownership of land confer either title or
possession upon the reputed owner. Moreover, even though
timber growing was the best use to which the land could be
put, absent testimony (and there was none) as to some con-
tinuing acts of cultivation done on the land by the adverse
claimant, it is difficult to see why the natural maturation
of trees should establish a possession in the claimant'rather
than the landowner.12
Nevertheless, when the above facts are considered as a,
whole, together with certain additional matters pointed up
in the transcript of record,13 it would seem that the equities
(the term is used in the popular sense) were loaded in favor
of the adverse claimant. At best the concept of possession is
an elastic one which in various contexts and for different pur-
poses has a wide range of meaning.14 In a situation such as
was here presented the totality of the transaction is greater
than the sum of its parts, and it would seem not unreasonable
to conclude, for the purpose of protecting the claimant, that
a jury would be warranted in finding he had established
title by adverse possession.
10. In South Carolina the period for acquisition of title to land by
adverse possession is ten years. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §
10-124 (1952).
11. See the cases collected in 2 C. J. 69, n. 78, (1915). See Gregg v.
Moore, 226 S. C. 366, 85 S. E. 2d 279 (1954). See also McBeth v. Con-.
nelly, Dudley 177 (1838).
12. See CODE OF LAWS OF 'SOUTH* CAROLINA § 10-242 (1952), which in,
part provides that ".... the person establishing a legal title to the pre-
mises shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the'time
required by law."
13. It appears that the tax sale was in 1939 or earlier (R. 48). There
is no evidence that after the sale the defendant record owners' mani-
fested any interest in the land prior to the present suit in 195.7, which
was brought to enable plaintiff to mortgage the land as security for a
loan. (R. 58).
14. The following comment in explanation of the varied meanings given
possession seems relevant here:
The primary object of a court of law is to achieve an acceptable
solution of the particular controversy, which contending litigants
have placed before it, and not to present a technically perfect
exercise of logic. The courts ordinarily shape their logical devices
to achieve desired ends, and do not discard a longed-for 'result in
order to preserve the integrity of a syllogistic mechanism. BRoWN,
PERSONAL PRoPERaTY 20 (2d ed. 1955).
[Vol. 14"
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The further holding that adverse possession had been es-
tablished as a matter of law is more debatable; 5 as is so.
often the case, what is to be considered beyond doubt may
itself be doubted. On balance, possibly the decision is best
explained as one sui generis and of little value as an exact
precedent because of the peculiar factual situation which
determined the result of the case.
Adverse Possession of Railway Right of Way
In Smith v. Southern Ry.16 the defendant railway orig-
inally had fee simple title to a right of way through plain-
tiff's farm extending one hundred feet from the center of
the track on each side. After plaintiffs acquired the farm,,
they maintained a fence on a line thirty-five feet west of
the center of the track. In the summer the land within the.
fence was cultivated and in the winter it was used to graze.
cattle. Each spring the fence was removed to permit the
use of tractors in cultivating, and after the crops were culti-
vated in the fall, the fence was replaced to confine the cattle-
After this practice had been continued for some fourteem
years without objection from defendant, defendant's section.
master sought to stop plaintiffs from replacing the fence, he-
contending that it was on the railway's property. One of
plaintiffs then told the section master that the land was
plaintiffs', and, in effect, ordered the section master off the,
land. Thereafter plaintiffs, without further objection from,
defendant, continued their fencing practice for an additiona
twenty-five years, after which time they sued for damage to.
their crops growing within the fenced area. The case being-
submitted to a jury on special issues, the jury found that
plaintiffs had acquired title to the sixty-five foot strip by
adverse possession.
On appeal, the judgment for plaintiffs was affirmed. The
Court discussed earlier cases to the effect that since a railway,
frequently has no immediate need for all of its right of way,.
the use for agricultural purposes such as grazing and culti-
vation of a portion of the way by an adjacent landowner
ordinarily forms no basis for a claim of hostile possession,
nor is the mere enclosure of a part thereof by a fence suffi-
15. As pointed out in note 3, supra, the testimony was quite vague on,
the important issue as to the year in which the timber was cut.
16. 237 S. C. 597, 118 S. E. 2d 440 (1961).
1962] 193
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cient to put the railway on notice of a claim of adverse
possession.
However, "if an adjacent landowner under a claim of
ownership encloses a portion of right of way by a substantial
fence and refuses upon demand to remove it ... [sluch an
assertion of right to exclusive occupancy of the land... may
form the basis of a claim of adverse possession." The Court
then observed that while in most of the cases the railway
had a mere easement, in the instant case "the claim of ad-
-verse possession is strengthened by the fact that [defendant]
had fee simple title to its right of way."' 7 In the Court's
,opinion, "the evidence fully warrants an inference that the
-leriod of adverse possession commenced running when [plain-
tiffs] told the section master that they owned the property
.and replaced the fence over his protest."
Relative to defendant's contention that the continuity of
:any adverse possession was broken each spring when the
2fence was removed, the Court quoted earlier cases to the
,effect that actual possession once taken will continue despite
itemporary absences of the possessor until he be disseised,
,or until he does some act amounting to an abandonment of
7possession. Viewing the facts in the instant case, the Court
,opined, "We cannot say as a matter of law.., that [plaintiff's
possession] was broken each year by the removal of the
fence. Not only was there a seasonal operation with the
animo revertendi always present but when the fence was re-
moved [plaintiffs] continued to occupy the property by culti-
vation of the land."
Disputed Boundary-Adverse Possession and Acquiescence
Lynch v. Lynch'8 was an action of trespass to try title to
-a disputed area between adjoining tracts owned by plaintiff
17. Relative to the presumption that the use of a portion of a railway
right of way by an adjacent landowner is permissive and not adverse,
it, was said in Blume v. Southern Ry., 85 S. C. 440, 443, 67 S. E. 546,
547 (1910):
The fact that defendant [railroad] owns the fee in the land, and
not merely an easement, can make no difference; for if defendant
cannot alien or lose by prescription an easement acquired by purchase
or condemnation, neither can it alien or lose by prescription the
fee in the right of way acquired by purchase. It is not the character
of the estate, but the public purpose for which it was acquired,
and with which it is burdened, which takes it out of the general
rule.
18. 236 S. C. 612, 115 S. E. 2d 301 (1960).
i94 [Vol. 14
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/4
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
and defendant respectively. The answer of the defendants
denied title in the plaintiffs and set up title in themselves
by adverse possession and presumption of a grant. The
trial of the case resulted in judgment on a verdict for plain-
tiff, which was affirmed on appeal.
The Court found that the trial judge was correct in hold-
ing as a matter of law that the evidence established legal
title to be in the plaintiff. This being true, the Court pointed
out that "[w]here a person proves legal title to property,
the person so proving the legal title is presumed to have
been in possession of the land within ten years."
There was conflicting testimony as to the length of time
defendants and their predecessor had used the locus,
as well as testimony from which it might be concluded
that defendants had occupied the land under the mistaken
belief that it was part of the adjoining tract which they
owned. In commenting on a charge of the trial judge as to
the effect of an occupancy of land under mistaken belief of
ownership, the Court stated:
... that the occupancy of land beyond the true boundary
line, by an encroaching owner, does not form a basis
for adverse possession, unless the encroachment is made
with an intention to claim and hold adversely. Where
one [who] is in the possession of land up to a supposed
line intends to claim only to the true line, his possession
is not hostile and will not ripen into title.
A further charge "that if adjoining land owners occupy
their respective premises up to a certain line which they
recognize as the boundary line between the tracts, . . . they
are precluded from claiming the line is not the true line..."
evoked the comment, "It is well settled that a boundary line
dividing the land of adjoining owners may be established by
a parol agreement of such owners, and such becomes con-
clusive against the owners and those claiming under them."
As against defendants' contention that verdict should have
been directed in their favor, the Court found that the circuit
judge properly had submitted the case to the jury, since
"[the evidence was in dispute and more than one inference
could be drawn therefrom."
1962]
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Adverse Possession Against a Tenant in Common
In South Carolina the well established rule is that as
against a claim of adverse possession under the ten year
statute of limitations19 by one tenant in common against
his co-tenants, the possession of the occupying tenant is pre-
sumed to be in recognition of, rather than hostile to, the in-
terests of his co-tenants. The presumption may be rebutted
by evidence of an ouster of the co-tenants, but the acts
relied upon to establish such ouster "must be of unequivocal
nature, and so distinctly hostile to the rights of the other
co-tenants that the intention to disseize is clear and unmis-
takable." 20
However, if it is shown that for twenty years or more
there has been an exclusive possession with the use and
exercise of authority incident to exclusive and adverse owner-
ship, such evidence "is sufficient to rebut the presumption
that possession is in subordination to the legal title, and to
establish the presumption of a grant or deed, and almost
any other presumption necessary to the protection of the
possession.
'" 21
In Home v. Cox, 22 the defendant co-tenant asserting title
by adverse possession had been in exclusive possession for
seventeen years prior to institution of suit for partition,
23
during which time he allegedly had held himself out as sole
owner and had exercised the authority incident to such owner-
ship. Under the facts of the case, however, the Court found
no evidence that notice of an ouster had been given his co-
tenants, and therefore the trial judge's direction of verdict
against the claimant of exclusive title by adverse possession
was affirmed. "Only in rare cases, which may be said to
be extreme," stated the Court, "has it been held that ouster
of the other co-tenants was implied from exculsive possession,
19. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA § 10-124 (1952).
20. Among the many cases to this effect, see Wells v. Coursey, 197
S. C. 483, 15 S. E. 2d 752 (1941). See also Note, 11 S. C. L. Q. 520,
529 (1959).
21. Wells v. Coursey, supra, quoting Powers v. Smith, 80 S. C. 110,
61 S. E. 223 (1908). It seems that the presumption of ouster arising
from twenty years possession is not conclusive, however, and ordinarily
makes a question of fact for a jury. Whitaker v. Jeffcoat, 128 S. C.
404, 122 S. E. 495 (1924).
22. 237 S. C. 41, 115 S. E. 2d 513 (1960).
23. The Record (p. 87) discloses that the claimant asserted an ex-
clusive occupancy after the death of his mother in 1937. Suit for partition
was instituted in 1954.
[Vol.-14
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collection of rents, and improvements of the property by one
co-tenant."
Construction of Deeds-Rule in Shelley's Case
Smoak v. McLure24 presented the Court with the problem
of determining the interests created by an obviously home-
drawn deed of land executed in 190925 by a father to his son.
The consideration recited was "the sum of the love and affec-
tion I have for my son and one dollars" [sic]. The granting
clause was "unto the said Ben Garris, his natural lifetime,
then to heirs or next of kin in case he has no heirs." The
habendum clause, which was regular in form, read "unto the
said Ben Garris, and his heirs and assigns forever." The deed
contained a general warranty "to Ben Garris or his heirs and
assigns," and the renunciation of dower was "unto the within
named Ben Garris, or his heirs or next nearest of kin heirs
and assigns."
Disposition of the case in the circuit court is thus sum-
marized by the Supreme Court:
The Master to whom the case was referred concluded
that the word 'heirs' in the granting clause was not
used in its technical sense but to denote 'children'; that
Ben Garris acquired only a life estate with remainder
in fee to his children but if he 'died without leaving
any children then the property would go to his next
of kin'; that words of inheritance were not necessary as
the deed should be construed as a covenant to stand
seized to uses ;26 that this construction of the granting
24. 236 S. C. 548, 115 S. E. 2d 55 (1960).
25. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 57-2 (1952), which abolishes
the rule in Shelley's case is inapplicable to instruments executed prior
to October 1, 1924.
26. Since the rule in Shelly's case was held applicable on appeal, the
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to determine whether or not the
deed might otherwise have been construed as a covenant to stand seized
to uses. Whether such construction would have been permissible is
doubtful, in view of the fact that the grantor reserved no life estate in
himself.
If the record had established (the Court's opinion points out that it
did not) that the son had no living child at the time of the conveyance,
it seems that despite the failure to reserve a life estate the deed might
have been so construed. This, at least, was the opinion of Mr. Justice
Cothran, the father of the South Carolina version of the covenant to
stand seized to uses. See his concurring opinion in Wallace v. Taylor,
127 S. C. 121, 120 S. E. 838 (1924). See also the circuit decree of
Circuit Judge W. H. Townsend in Campbell v. Williams, 171 S. C. 279,
172 S. E. 142 (1933). An alternative ground of the decision of Judge
1962]
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clause rendered it in conflict with the habendum clause
but under the well settled rule the former should pre-
vail; and that appellants, the only living children of the
grantee, were now vested with fee simple title. The re-
port of the Referee was reversed by the Circuit Judge
who held that the deed conveyed to Ben Garris fee simple
title and that it was immaterial, in view of the fact that
he had living children when he conveyed it, whether
such title be regarded as a fee simple absolute or a fee
conditional.
In affirming the circuit decree, the Supreme Court found
"... no language sufficient to overcome the presumption that
the word 'heirs' was used in its technical sense as a word
of limitation." 27 The rule in Shelley's case applied to give an
estate of inheritance to the grantee. Whether such estate
was a fee simple or a fee simple conditional was immaterial,
said the Court, as the grantee had children living when he
thereafter undertook to convey a fee simple estate.
Townsend was that the deed there in issue (from a father to his daughter
for life, and then to her surviving issue), which reserved no life estate
to the grantor, could be construed as a covenant to stand seized to uses
requiring no words of inheritance to convey the fee. On appeal, the
decision of Judge Townsend was unanimously affirmed, the circuit de-
cree being stated to be "entirely satisfactory to this Court," and its
report ordered. In First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ford, 177
S. C. 40, 180 S. E. 562 (1935), the Court cited with approval this
alternative ground of the holding in Campbell v. Williams, supra.
The reviewer has heretofore paid his respects to the question in an
article, Words of Inheritance in Deeds of Land in South Carolina: A
Title Examiner's Guide, 5 S. C. L. Q. 313, 337 (1953). As there stated,
the reviewer knows of no South Carolina case which, on proper reading,
is controlling as against the authorities cited in the second paragraph
of this note.
27. It will be noted that the alternative limitation in the grant was to
"next of kin in case he [the ancestor] has no heirs." When so used it
would seem that both heirs and next of kin may not be assigned their
primary meanings, since if the grantor had no general heirs he necessarily
would have no next of kin. Even conceding that the grantor meant other
than heirs general however, it would follow that heirs must be construed
as heirs of the body or as issue, since it is improbable that the grantor
intended his son's general heirs to take if the son were survived by grand-
children instead of by children. Cf. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S. C.
123, 107 S. E. 2d 4 (1959). [In the instant case, no additional language
would allow the remainder to be read as one to children or their lineal
representatives per stirpes, as in Bank of Prosperity v. Dominick, 116
S. C. 228, 107 S. E. 914 (1921).] Since the rule in Shelley's case still
would apply if heirs were construed as heirs of the body or as issue, as
pointed out by the Court, the result in the instant case would be the same
under either construction.
10
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Judicial Sales-Partition
In Bennett v. Floyd,2 8 the Court, in rejecting an attack
on a partition action which had been unassailed for more than
thirty years, relied on the principle that:
... the purchaser in good faith at a judicial sale is bound
only to see that the Court had jurisdiction of the subject
of the action and of the parties in interest. He is not
affected by irregularities or errors in the record for
which the judgment might have been vacated in a direct
attack, or reversed on appeal, or by secret vices affecting
the judgment, which are not disclosed by examination
of the record.29
Evidence that an affidavit of service contained in the re-
cord was false was found to be insufficient. On this point the
Court quoted Singleton v. Mullins Lumber Co. :30
Due proof of service appears in the record of the fore-
closure proceeding. Such a record, standing as it has
for approximately half a century, may not be overthrown
by less than the clearest and most convincing evidence.
To hold otherwise would be a dangerous thing, imperiling
titles to real estate and other rights long since ad-
judicated; it would, moreover, be contrary to precedent
unbroken in the history of our jurisprudence. Even
though proof of service were wholly lacking, it would
be presumed that the Court that rendered the judgment
would not have done so without proper proof of the
service of the summons in the cause.
Nor did the record support appellant's contention that one
of the heirs of the deceased owner had been omitted in the
partition action.
An argument that the partition decree was invalid because
the Court was without power to allot one tenant in common
his share in kind while ordering a sale of the remainder was
found to be without merit. "While we have found no case in
this State passing precisely upon the question now under
consideration," said the Court, "the general authority else-
where is that a court of equity under proper circumstances
28. 237 S. C. 64, 115 S. E. 2d 659 (1960).
29. The quotation by the Court is from Gladden v. Chapman, 106
S. C. 486, 91 S. E. 796 (1917).
30. 234 S. C. 330, 342, 108 S.-E. 2d 414, 420 (1959).
1962] 199
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may allot a part of the land to one co-tenant and order the
remainder sold for division among the other co-tenants."
No statute impairing this inherent equitable power was
found.
Finally, the contention that the land had been sold at a
grossly inadequate price as a result of fraudulent collusion
between certain parties to the partition action was found not
to have been established. Moreover, "[ilf there existed such
a conspiracy," the Court stated, "it was a vice which could
not have been discovered by an examination of the record
and, therefore, could not affect a bona fide purchaser."
Partition
In Mallow v. Watson3' the owner of an undivided one-
half interest in land, within six months after the death of
the owner of the other undivided one-half interest, brought
the instant action for partition against the heirs of the de-
ceased. Certain of these heirs already had sued to partition
,other lands of the deceased (to which suit the plaintiff in
the instant action was not a party), and these heirs moved
to stay all proceedings in the instant action until the final
,determination of the prior partition action, and for a further
order staying all proceedings until the expiration of six
mnonths from the date of the death of the deceased.
In affirming the circuit court's refusal to stay the pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court pointed out that plaintiff in
the instant action had no interest in the lands sought to be
partitioned in the prior action, and that subject to an ex-
ception not presented by the facts, "[t]he general rule is that
where it is sought to partition several parcels of land, it is
essential that each of the parties to the proceeding have an
interest in the entire property." The Court further observed
that it was "difficult to see any basis for [the heirs'] claim
to a stay of the instant action when they failed to make [plain-
tiff] a party to the other action."
Relative to the heirs' contention that further proceedings
should have been stayed until six months after the death of
the deceased,32 the Court pointed out that the period already
31. 237 S. C. 226, 116 S. E. 2d 689 (1960).
82. In Ex parte Worley, 49 S. C. 41, 26 S. E. 949 (1897), the Court
declared it to be "a settled rule of practice . . . not to entertain a bill
for partition until 12 months from the death of intestate. . ." [Since
o [Vol. 14
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had expired during pending of the appeal. It was further
noted that the administrators of the estate of the deceased
had been made parties to the instant action as required
by Circuit Court Rule 54, "and it Will be assumed that in
the partition decree proper provision will be made to protect
the creditors, if any, of decedent's estate." The Court in
addition commented that the appellant heirs were "hardly in
a position to claim that the instant action was prematurely
commenced when they themselves brought within the six
months period an action to partition the other property owned
by decedent."
Reservation of Power to Repurchase Land Conveyed
In Byars v. Cherokee County,33 the defendant county had
purchased from plaintiff a lot of land to be used as the site
of a potato curing house. Pursuant to agreement of the
parties, the deed of conveyance contained the following pro-
vision:
Provided, that in case the said lot of land shall cease to
be used by the County of Cherokee for curing house
purposes that the said Forrest Byars shall have the right
to repurchase the said lot of land and have same recon-
veyed to him upon payment of the said purchase price
of $50.00, Cherokee County to have the right to remove
therefrom at that time, any improvements placed on the
said land if desired.
A curing house was erected on the lot, but when the county
later ceased to use it for such purpose plaintiff then requested
a reconveyance as provided in the deed. Thereafter the
the amendment of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-554 (1952),
(Act No. 767 of 1956) to permit suits against an executor or, admin-
istrator within six months, it seems that the period prescribed in Worley
now would be six months.] See also Horton v. Horton, 214 S. C. 141,
51 S. E. 2d 425 (1949); Smith v. Pearson, 210 S. C. 524, 43 S. E. 2d 479
(1947). In Connor v. McCoy, 83 S. C. 165, 65 S. E. 257 (1909), an action
to marshall assets and for partition was held to be maintainable within
twelve months, the Court saying: "The rule there laid down [in Ex
parte Worley] was that such an action (for partition) is premature un-
less the administratrix be a party or provision is made for debts. This
action [in Connor] was by the administratrix and was for ascertain-
ment and payment of debts primarily." And in Gladden v. Chapman,
106 S. C. 486, 91 S. E. 796 (1917), the Court pointed out "... it is only
a rule of practice, and, while the failure to observe it may have been
error, which would have been corrected on application to the Court or on
appeal from the judgment, clearly it was not a jurisdictional defect."
33. 237 S. C. 548, 118 S. E. 2d 324 (1961).
1962]
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County Board of Commissioners sold the curing house build-
ing at public auction, and reconveyed the lot to plaintiff for
the sum of $50.00. Plaintiff purchased the building from
the purchaser at the auction sale, and used the lot and build-
ing at public auction, and reconveyed the lot to plaintiff for
highway purposes. Plaintiff then sued for judicial affir-
mation of his title to the lot and building and an adjudi-
cation that he alone was entitled to the proceeds of the
condemnation award. Defendant contended that the acts of
the Board of Commissioners were void and ultra vires, and
that the conduct of plaintiff and the board constituted a
fraud upon the taxpayers of the county.
In affirming the lower court decree for plaintiff the Su-
preme Court held that defendant county was bound to make
the reconveyance, and that it was barred by laches and
estoppel from repudiating it. The estate conveyed by the deed
was characterized as one on condition subsequent, the Court
saying:
The condition stated in the deed in this case, giving the
grantor by the express words used, the right to a recon-
veyance of the property should the appellant cease to use
the land for curing house purposes, is a condition sub-
sequent, and upon the happening of the event stated
entitled the grantor to a reconveyance of the property.
Assuming that the repurchase provision made the estate
conveyed the grantee one on condition subsequent, the de-
cision of the Court would seem to be the correct one. How-
ever, it may be that the deed should have been construed to
create a repurchase option in the grantor rather than an
estate on condition subsequent, since the privilege reserved
by the grantor was exercisable only upon the payment of
money, and the grantee obligated itself to execute a deed of
reconveyance 3 4 One difference in the legal effect of the two
is that while the right of entry reserved by the grantor upon
conveyance of an estate on condition subsequent is not sub-
ject to the rule against perpetuities,35 an option to repurchase
reserved by the grantor is void if capable of being exercised
beyond the period of the rule.36
34. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 394 comment c (1940); BuRBY, REAL
PROPERTY § 174 (2d ed. 1954).
35. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 769 (1956). The English authority
is contra. Ibid.
36. 5 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 779 (1956).
[Vol. 14202
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In the instant case, if it be assumed that the repurchase
privilege was exercisable only within the period of the rule
against perpetuities, 37 it would seem that the provision was
valid, whether it be construed as a repurchase option or as a
right of entry for breach of condition subsequent.
Vendor and Vendee-Action for Fraud and Deceit
Lancaster v. Smithco, Inc.38 was an action for fraud and
deceit by the vendees against the vendors of a house and lot.
The vendors had conveyed by a general warranty deed which
described the land conveyed by specific reference to a re-
corded plat as well as by metes and bounds. The plat referred
to showed that the lot conveyed was subject to an easement
ninety feet wide across the rear of the lot for the installation
of pipe lines, but the deed made no mention of the easement.
The vendees testified that they relied solely on the warranty
and did not inspect the plat nor have the title examined; and
they had no knowledge of the easement until some time after
their purchase.
The trial resulted in judgment for the plaintiffs and a
verdict for actual damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court
remanded the case for entry of a non-suit in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule 27, on the ground that the vendees had
failed to prove that the vendors intended to deceive them,
proof of which fact is an essential element in an action for
fraud and deceit. The Court observed that the vendees had
relied solely upon the warranty in the deed to prove a false
representation with intent to deceive, but "[i]n this case we
are of the opinion that the general warranty does not justify
a finding of an intent to deceive." The Court expressly
withheld its opinion as zo whether or not the evidence would
justify a finding of a breach of warranty.
A number of cases which are discussed in detail in other
sections of the annual survey have been omitted from the
37. It should be noted that an option to purchase land is not necessarily
bad merely because no time limit has been specified. It may be that
a proper interpretation of the contract would be to the effect that
it is to be exercised in a reasonable time, which, in most cases,
would be less than twenty-one years. Or it may be that the option
was to be personal to the one to whom it was given. If that be
true, of course, it is good, since it would be exercised in his life-
time.
SIMES & SMITH, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1244 (2d ed. 1956) (footnotes
omitted).
88. 238 S. C. 15, 119 S. E. 2d 145 (1961).
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property section. One 9 which is treated in the wills section,
held that in an action for partition in kind of the realty of a
decedent, one of the heirs could not file a counter claim for
services allegedly rendered the decedent during her lifetime
by that heir. Also included in the wills section is Austin v.
Summers,40 an action by an administrator to recover the
decedent's alleged one-half interest in a joint account in a
savings and loan association.
A third case,41 an action to enjoin the maintenance in a
residential area of a business establishment constructed in
reliance on a void grant of a variance, is discussed in the
public corporations section. Also discussed under public
corporations is Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water Distrit,
42
in which it was held that plaintiffs, developers of subdivisions
who had constructed water lines under streets they had con-
veyed to the county, were entitled to compensation from the
defendant water district, which had taken over operation of
the water lines, on the theory that defendant had exercised
its power of eminent domain.
Discussion of Davis v. Cordell,43 a suit by a vendor to have
a contract for the sale of land adjudged void for uncertainty
and cancelled because of purchaser's failure to perform
within a reasonable time, will be found under contracts.
Legislation
Two statutes44 pertaining to renunciations of inchoate
dower interests in land were enacted by the 1961 General
Assembly.
Requirement That Notary Public Affix His Official Seal
to Renunciations of Dower Within the State
Act No. 21741 strikes out the general section46 dealing
with dower renunciations and substitutes therefor a shorter
section intended, as indicated by the act's title, "to simplify
the provisions relating to renunciation of dower." Prior to
39. Watson v. Watson, 237 S. C. 274, 117 S. E. 2d 145 (1960).
40. 237 S. C. 613, 118 S. E. 2d 684 (1961).
41. Aughtry v. Farrell, 237 S. C. 604, 118 S. E. 2d 569 (1961).
42. 237 S. C. 144, 116 S. E. 2d 13 (1960).
43. 237 S. C. 88, 115 S. E. 2d 649 (1960).
44. Acts Nos. 217 and 244 of 1961.
45. 52 Stat. 416 (1961).
46. CODE 0F LAws OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 19-111 (1952).
204 [Vol. 14
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amendment of the section there was an express provision47
that renunciations taken by a notary public within the State
were valid despite the failure of the notary to affix his
official seal to the certificate of renunciation, and omission
of the seal was common practice. However, the substituted
section, 48 without making an exception in the case of renun-
ciations taken within the State, provides in part: "The
officer shall append to the writing his certificate in the form
prescribed by § 19-114 [which details the form of the re-
nunciation], and affix his official seal,49 if any." In view of
the mandatory form of the quoted language, it may be that
renunciations taken within the State since the effective date
(May 4, 1961) of the substituted statute are defective unless
the notary's official seal was affixed.50
Certainly it is unlikely that the substituted statute was
intended so drastically to alter a well established convey-
ancing practice, and it is probable that corrective legislation
reaffirming (if not revalidating) the prior practice will be
enacted during the next legislative session. If such legis-
lation expressly undertakes to validate renunciations taken
prior to its enactment,51 it seems that it may operate retro-
spectively to cure a defect (assuming that such exists) aris-
ing because of omission of the notary's seal after May 4,
47. § 19-111 in part provided for renunciations taken within the State
before a "notary public with or without official seal . . . ." The proviso
was added to the section in 1922 (Act No. 524 of 1922). In Bratton v.
Burris, 51 S. C. 45, 28 S. E. 13 (1897), the Court, construing an earlier
text of the dower renunciation statute, held that omission of the notary's
seal was a fatal defect, and that the invalid certificate did not estop the
wife from obtaining dower.
48. Supra, note 45.
49. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 49-6 (1952) provides: "Each
notary public shall have a seal of office, which shall be affixed to his
instruments of publication and to his protestations. But the absence of
such seal shall not render his acts invalid if his official title be affixed
thereto." Should the question be litigated, it, of course, is possible that
the Court may construe § 49-6 in par materid with Act No. 217. See
Bratton v. Burris, 51 S. C. 45, 50, 28 S. E. 13 (1897). Cf. First Presby-
terian Church of York v. York Depository, 203 S. C. 410, 422, 27 S. E. 2d
573 (1943). If this is done, renunciations not under the official seal of the
notary taken since May 4, 1961, are valid because of the second sentence
of § 49-6, supra.
50. See Bratton v. Burris, supra. See also 39 AM. JuR., Notary
Public §§ 34, 35 (1942). But see the second sentence of CODE OF LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 49-6 (1952) set out in note 49, supra.
51. The amendment of 1922 (Act No. 524 of 1922) in part undertook
to validate dower renunciations not under official seal of the notary
taken within the State before the amendment. [This provision of the
amendment is one of several provisions now embodied in CODE OF LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-116 (1952).] No case considering the amend-
ment has been found.
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1961, and before passage of the corrective act, provided that
the grantor is alive on the effective date of the act.52 How-
ever, in the event that the grantor does not survive until
enactment of a corrective statute, since the dower interest
of the wife would have become consummate rather than in-
choate, it is doubtful that subsequent legislation could operate
to defeat her vested interest 8
Absent such curative legislation and assuming that Act No.
217 altered the prior law, one may question54 whether a
dower renunciation taken without affixing the notary's seal
subsequent to May 4, 1961, may be corrected other than by
taking a 'new renunciation if the husband is alive, 55 or, if
he be dead, other than by obtaining a deed from his widow.56
Renunciation of Dower on Land to be Conveyed
or Mortgaged by Power of Attorney
Act No. 24457 permits renunciations of dower on lands to
be conveyed or mortgaged under powers of attorney by the
wives of persons executing such powers. In general, the
prescribed form of the renunciation is similar to that pro-
vided for renunciations of dower by the wives of grantors and
mortgagors of land. 8
52. See Note, 20 A. L. R. 1330 (1922); 17A AM. Jun., Dower § 9
(1957).
53. See Note, 20 A. L. R. 1330, 1333 (1922); 17A AM. Jun., Dower
§ 10 (1957).
54. Whether the notary's affixation of his seal subsequent to delivery
of the deed can operate to cure the imperfect renunciation is not clear.
See 39 Am. JUn., Notary Public § 34 (1942), and certain of the cases
collected in 74 Am. Dec. 368, 369 (1911); 46 C. J., Notaries § 35 (1928).
Cf. Scanlon v. Turner, 1 Bail. 421, 425 (1830).
55. CODE OF LAWS o SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-112 (1952).
56. Jefferies v. Allen, 29 S. C. 501, 7 S. E. 828 (1888); Bethune v.
McDonald, 35 S. C. 88, 14 S. E. 674 (1892).
57. Act No. 244 of 1961.
58. CODE Or LAws oF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 19-116 (1952).
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